Computer drives and hardware players are different things in AACS. Hardware players have "individual" keys that can be revoked (up to a point, at least).
Computer drives interface with software players through a complex cryptographic scheme, but computer drives do indeed have a single key across the product line. It can be revoked, but that's as you say unlikely to happen.
Now, the current attacks use this part of the protocol. To decrypt a disc, I understand that you need two things: The processing key, and the Volume ID. The attack referred to in >>23 gives you the Volume ID. However, it requires soldering, making it entirely useless for pretty much everyone. The best it can give you is that someone else does it and gets Volume IDs for the discs you have, and posts them on the internet, but with enough discs around that won't be feasible.
You still also need the processing key. That's what >>1 contains, but this key can and will be changed easily. I believe that it could theoretically be different for every single disc, and that the only reason current discs use the same one is only convenience.
In summary: There's still a long way left before you can play your HD-DVDs in VLC. This has merely been the initial battles of a long war.