There's always this or that tribe or gang arguing over where exactly the border between Dirtfarmia and Industrial-Factorystan lies, the Glorious Democratic People's Republic of Bureaucratic Corruption keeps trying to tie up in red tape any attempts by "its" citizens to emigrate to areas not suffering mass starvation, and vigilantes in Shariaville like to vandalize resident Internet backbone servers to protect everyone's virtue from the decadent infidels the next sand dune over.
When are we going to get our one world government so we can move on past this juvenile bullshit?
LOL
Yeah, pretty much. We could solve a lot of humanitarian crises by encouraging more flexible immigration of people. I mean we send humanitarian aid to places like Nepal and Somalia, and we think it's justified, but we never try to justify why people are living in such shit places to begin with.
OP here, and to speak seriously this time, while Nepalese and Somalians may live in shitholes, there's always a sort of sentiment for one's home town. Hell, the city of Pripyat was evacuated due to fallout from Chernobyl, and people are still squatting there because it's their home. I sure as hell won't stop a third-worlder from leaving for greener pastures, but I'm also keen on helping his neighbors live just a little easier.
I mainly see the New World Order as beneficial because it would be powerful enough make free medicine and education available worldwide. Also, it would cut down on (although I'm not enough of a dreamer to believe it would eliminate) war, because whenever a bunch of people form an army and start a fight, they're starting it with the rest of the planet.
Not to mention that areas are usually 'shit' because of their political and socioeconomic situation more so than any intrinsic quality of the land. Some of the places with the shittiest land from an agricultural perspective, such as Arabia and parts of the American Southwest, are among the richest in the world. The exact opposite is true around China's various rivers and the Ganges Delta in Bangladesh.
The NWO wouldn't work out for at least one simple reason: religion. Faith is thicker than water, and sometimes blood as well. If you'll accept an Islamic World Order then maybe we can talk. (Supposedly, there are people actively working toward such, but it might just be bigoted conspiracy bullshit)
It is wrong for a developped country with just a few million people to open it's borders to a country of 100s of millions where 95% of the population lives in medieval conditions. Especially if the poorer country does little to prevent overpopulation, prevent crime and indoctrinates it's minions to believe tyrannical ideals.
I don't think unifying the world is possible under happy circumstances. The other way it's possible, well, is kind of gruesome.
Yeah I know those mud people be crazy, right?
Seriously, if there's anything crazier than a One World Government coming to be, it's what you just spewed out.
Just tear gas. Lots and lots and lots of tear gas. The soldiers have to change out the charcoal in their gasmasks eventually, and no standalone country has enough gasmasks for everyone.
>>8
I do not view them as mud people. There is nothing crazy about what I just said.
You're afraid of brown folk because you fear they'll take the good jobs you feel entitled to despite being semiliterate. Go get some adult education and stop being a drain on the country.
>>10
I am glad you are interested in me, but I believe that you should get your facts straight.
I am not afraid of people with brown skin tones, since I myself and members of my family have such skin tones this would be absurd. I do not have any strong emotions concerning competition in the job market, I fail to see the relevance of the skin tones of people I compete with in the job market and I currently do not compete in the job market since I run my own business. I am already in adult education, I am in contact with my university alumni and occasionally peer review thesis' that garner my interest, I also regularly keep up to date with the latest changes in the market and technology. I am only a drain on the country in the most ambiguous definition of the phrase, I will be working this easter instead of not going on holiday and most of my wealth is tied up in stocks so I have made a net contribution to the economy discluding my student debts which I have nearly repaid.
Yeah, let's allow anyone who wants to move to a first world country just pack up and go. Because poor countries will be improved when all their doctors, inventors, professionals, and skilled tradesmen move to a richer country to make an extra buck.
Foreign aid needs to be cut off too: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,363663,00.html
In this article, a Kenyan economist explains how foreign aid has destroyed African economies.
I love these cute and cuddly political opinions. It's like a window into naivite that I will never be defenestrated into.
The affirmative’s identification of distinct countries and governing entities is a political act designed to reinforce the control of territorial boundaries and subjugation of peoples within those territories
Shapiro, 1988. - International Relations Theorist and professor of political science at the University of Hawaii (Michael J., The Politics of Representation: Writing practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis, Pub. By University of WI, Madison, p. 92)
Although there are relatively few quarrels about whether one should say “Guatemala” and thus let oneself be governed by the prevailing geo-political mode of representation, to do so is to engage in the continuation of a complex, historically developed practice. Guatemala is part of what we think of as international system, a historically produced set of relations among nations. The predominant grammar of this international system has all of the individual nations performing as subjects and objects in the practice of international speech, a set of statements, regarded as intelligible, which issues from national units. But these units, which are consolidated both in the recognized system of territorial boundaries and in speech practices, embody histories of struggles over how those units are to be represented and understood. The ordinary grammar employed in contemporary discourses, whether of national leaders, journalists, or social scientists, constitutes a forgetting of those struggles which, if they had ended in other ways, might have engendered other grammars and categories. The use of the dominant, intelligible grammar and category-set of international speech thus helps to reinforce a consolidated understanding of these national units, an understanding which accepts both the importance of existing international boundaries and the dominance of whatever person or group (regime, class ethnic group, etc.) manages to control domestic relations and attract recognition from the international community. As for groups who lost the struggles to maintain their practices (and have them be the ones that are intelligible), to the extent that we are reminded of those “Others” whose practices no longer control prevailing understandings on their old turf, the reminders are represented in other than a political code. For example, recently the Aztecs and Mayans appeared in one of the most sophisticated European newspapers not as victims of violence but as commodified perpetrators of it. In this recent advertisement in the travel of the London Times we are encouraged to conjure up their exotic practices in our imaginations as we visit their old haunts.
When we seek to make intelligible the politics of the Central American region we do not think of Aztecs and Mayans (nor of their descendants), for within modern speech practices, to invoke the name of a country as territory is to participate in a representational practice that belongs to what Foucault called the “tactics and strategies of power,” which have no use for the historical continuities, discontinuities, and fates of early indigenous groups. This is not the kind of power one associates with the active manipulations of a conscious, individual actor but rather the power immanent in the historical process through which any entity acquires and identity. The geographic “knowledge” we invoke in our naming helps, in Foucault’s terms, to put into circulation the tactics and strategies involved in the “demarcations” and “control of territories.” Thus, to the extent that one accepts and unreflectively reproduces the security-oriented, geopolitical discursive practice, one engages in implicit acts of recognition of the existing power and authority configurations.
This act of naming and identifying a place reinforces boundaries of inclusion and exclusion – these are used to normalize violence against the other
Rajaram and Soguk – Rajaram is an associate professor of management at UCLA Anderson , Soguk is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii- 2006 (Kumar and Nevzat, Oct-Dec, “Introduction: geography and reconceptualization of politics” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political)
The boundarying of a piece of space and its internal ordering rest on acts of exclusion, differentiation, and identification. The occupation of a piece of space initiates a concept of the political as place-based. It thus initiates a political vocabulary of "break, rupture and disjunction" where internally ordered and boundaried places of the political are distinguished from other ordered and boundaried places. These places of politics become the starting point, Gupta and Ferguson continue, "from which to theorize contact, conflict and contradiction between cultures and societies." (3) The transformative process by which unhinged and fluid spatiality comes to be pockmarked by stable political places gives us a political vocabulary or a structure of recognition through which identities and encounters, and the conflicts and contradictions that emanate from them, are rendered intelligible.
This then is the form of the political founded by spatial transformation: an enabling framework of recognition that sets particular parameters outlining the sayable and the unsayable. For Jacques Ranciere, the political is, fundamentally, a spatial organization where perceptible identities are those that make sense to the way space is organized. For the form of the political to retain its purchase, what Ranciere calls the "void" and the "supplement" must not be counted. (4) The political is a way of counting elements that locates them in their "proper place." This is a way of defining forms of partaking in politics that works by, first of all, defining the modes or manner of perception within which forms of partaking must function. The political community is the aggregate of these forms of partaking.
For Ranciere, a place-bound politics is premised on a structuring of community where a form of "identificatory distribution (naming, fixing in space, defining a proper place) is an essential component of government." (5) This creates a sense of the visible and the sayable. Certain things and certain acts may be recognized as "political" and that which has no basis from which to speak or be seen is imperceptible. The politics requires for its ongoing sense of permanence, is difficult to maintain. Rather than the power of the sovereign to transform spatiality into ordered permanence, we have an illusion of power.
[CONTINUES – NO TEXT DELETED]
maintenance of a place-based politics rests on the continuation of a system of recognition given by a particular purposive structuring of space. (6)
A central characteristic of a place-bound politics is, then, its claim to exhaustiveness. It works on the principle of saturation, where a space becomes filled by a particular mode of counting that identifies a political community. In this reading, place is the unproblematic repository of community. There is no place for "the void" or "the supplement," that which has no-part in the spatial organization of the political. This reading of space-as-container, which Ranciere critiques, is better understood as a representation of the political that centers on the enveloping of community by the nation-state (indeed, the conflation of "state," "nation," and "community" into an undetermined catchall conception of "place").
Giorgio Agamben's critique of place-based politics is "messianic," perhaps because of such conflation. Agamben sees the place of politics in terms of Schmittian sovereignty. Here the sovereign envelops place and guarantees its functioning. The true place of politics is thus necessarily outside of the sovereign's place, saturated by power and exhaustively controlled by the sovereign law. (7) Geographers like Doreen Massey and John Agnew, however, have argued that place is not to be seen as a clearly boundaried and ordered entity, saturated with the authority of the sovereign. (8) Rather, place-based identity is "constituted by the interactions between the extra-local forces of political economy and the historical layers of social relations." (9) Put another way, the tightly controlled place-bound identity, which a place-bound
This point leads us to two other lines of enquiry. One is an analysis of those techniques of discipline, repression, and exhibition by which a ruse of control over space is maintained. The other is an analysis of the "ambivalence, contradiction and paradox" inherent to place.
The first line of inquiry is adopted by those sociological and political works that make an examination of the micropractices of organization or ordering that give an impression or ruse of a clearly boundaried place over which a sovereign's authority and control (indeed, the presumption of a natural correspondence between the two) is assumed. One of the central themes of this line of enquiry is that of space-time compression under conditions of global capitalism. (10) Another central theme and idea here is that spaces are not mere containers where formations of power, such as global capitalism, flex themselves. Space is not a space merely to be filled but an element that compounds and limits formations of power. Speaking of "the global," John Law argues that "the global lies within each site and is small, sensuous, specific, heterogeneous, noncoherent and cannot be more than patchily modeled." (11) Space then is the "medium" and the "outcome" of processes of (global) capitalist development. What this means is that rather than being a container to be filled, space is constitutive of power and is constituted by it through ongoing dialectic processes of "de-and re-territorialization." (12)
Before the territorialization of the political, before its domestication and codification, there is, Diken and Laustsen argue, an indistinct space where those distinctions between friend and enemy, morality and immorality, no longer hold. What is being delineated and investigated in this study is thus a geography of the political as fissure, as the crack, the in-between zone before the conceptualization and codification of concrete territorialized political space. This fissure is understood by the authors as the space where the controlled and applied violence of territorialized society cannot hold. This is a postpolitical society, where the reification of the fissure makes the containment and application of violence no longer surgical or piecemeal. The characteristic of the fissure is its incapacity to contain and ground violence in the political: Violence becomes the norm and becomes spiteful, threatening extinction even as it claims to protect.
Ordering people into a particular territory creates colonial order and docile bodies – reject the affirmative’s dystopic representations because they are a justification for further ordering and colonialism, rendering people as subhuman
Rajaram- Professor @ University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Business – 2006 (Kumar, Oct-Dec, “Dystopic Geographies of Empire” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political)
A number of scholars show that European colonialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may be read in terms of a heterogeneous discourse of normalization, where an unruly space is transformed or is always undergoing a process of transformation into an orderly dominion populated by more or less knowable identities. (3) The discourses of normalization whereby normal forms of living within the gridded colony are identified and policed are representational practices. Such representational practices evoke complex structures of affect and aesthetics: The known dominion is essentially an imagined one. The discipline of organization is in a relation to the spectacle of representation. The organization of lives and living in the colony signify a greater and enveloping abstraction: that of a more or less metaphysical "framework." (4)
The representation of bodies and identities on an orderly grid harks to an absent conceptual frame--in the colony, perhaps notions of "progress, reason, law, discipline, history, colonial authority and order." (5) This order is the form of the colony, taken now as an aesthetic creation or landscape--a form that orders and enables the content. It is the framework that instantiates a way of thinking about the self and its relation to the past, the present, and the future (and to how each of these concepts is articulated); in short, it is the framework--of order, reason, progress, or what have you--that provides an arena of secure predictability. The power of the colonial order is not to be studied solely in its effects (docile and knowable bodies) but in what the sum of organized bodies represent (a particular European or Western mode of thinking about the self, its relation to external reality, and the extent to which the principles of order can be discerned in an external reality). This is thus the hierarchy and the dystopia. The systematic completeness of the Western Cartesian mind, able to grasp and desirous of grasping the ordering structures of external realities, presumes and is founded on its opposite--the irregular and disorderly non-European mind: "When we pass from works of imagination to works in which facts are recorded, and general principles investigated, the superiority of the Europeans becomes absolutely immeasurable." (6)
The organization of the colony and the colonized body should not, I argue, be understood solely as a decentered force to be studied in its effects: It should be associated also with a series of enabling frameworks whose specific form changes over space and time. These point then to fluid hegemonic processes and ideologies. Such hegemonic processes and ideologies give hierarchy; they denote the premodern or the primitive (essentially, they enable the translation of recognized "cultural" differences between peoples into a series of value judgments on the relative worth of other, non-Western, lives). It is important to note that such hegemonic processes are neither purely discursive, in a limited sense, nor unrelated to a material base--a material base, of relations of production, of the production and promulgation of military force, that enacted and was fed by systematic processes of colonial exploitation based on the conceptualization of land and people as economic goods.
Such hegemonic processes and/or ideologies are founded upon and cyclically enable the continual identification of dystopia and dystopic space. It is inherent in the identification of spaces of order that spaces of dystopia are presumed. It is inherent in the promise of the modern utopia of progress that some are confined to the imaginary waiting room of history. (7) Dystopia enables and vindicates the gridding of colonial space.
Dystopic imaginations are fundamentally aesthetic forms of knowing. The aesthetic process of knowing, following the Frankfurt school and particularly Theodor Adorno, is imbued with affect: with a volatile and perhaps sensuous investment of the self with and against its other. (8) A dystopic imagination of the colony, where the native and his space is understood in terms of lack, imagines a relation of power centered on extremes. Colonization may be read as a process that reduces the colonized to a subhumanity, thus setting up a teleology or vision of progress and change through a civilizing mission. It is important to read and trace the contours of colonial power from those disciplinary processes that create the colonial state down to "the intimacies of human bodies." (9) If the process of colonization as disciplinary procedure may be understood as a gradual process of creating a governable space, and if that process hinges on a dystopic imagination of the space as lack and its inhabitants as occupying a lower niche on an evolutionary scale of humanity, then the point at which the brutality underpinning representations of a civil order of colonialism becomes evident is in bodies.
Our alternative is to reject the plan as part of the colonial project to control identity through the maintenance of territorial boundaries.
Changing our thinking is the first step to challenging the ordering of the world through borders – this is the only way we can articulate justice as a barrier to colonial violence
Rajaram- Professor @ University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Business – 2006 (Kumar, Oct-Dec, “Dystopic Geographies of Empire” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political)
The spaces of orderly relations, and of affective longing, that these polities come to represent denote thus also a dystopic otherness. The force of the colonial ordering of space was its enforcement of a particular static space within which community was to be organized and understood. Elements and groups within that community were and are placed along particular grids that allow for forms of action that, in a circular way, reassert or vindicate the grids and the allocations of agency and permissible action. This cyclical process amounts to a static temporality, in which conceptions of belonging and of the scope or remit of the politically and ethically possible (and desirable) becomes contained by the territorial border (or, more specifically, is always undergoing a process of containment in the face of different forms of challenge).
It is important that bodies and groups also represent or denote an absent conceptual frame, a more or less metaphysical framework that is the form of the polity. The polity is not to be understood solely in terms of how it organizes bodies, but in terms also of what the sum of these organized bodies represent. The form of the polity enables and orders its content. It signifies the polity as an aesthetic landscape of order, worthy of affective affiliation. At the same time, the aesthetic landscape may be understood as a subject of work: Aesthetically pleasing landscapes require a certain amount of policing. Undesirable elements, blots on the landscape, become identifiable as elements that have no place in the orderly polity. They are thus subject to expulsion or erasure, acts that enable the boundary of the community to be drawn and its affective order asserted. Such blots on the landscape are, as aesthetically unpleasing elements, placed in a visceral zone. It is in this zone that torture takes place. The zone spills over into the norm (for example, the economic relation to which migrant workers are subject to in Malaysia).
This complex process of boundary making against "otherness" confined to a zone of visceral relations was the fundamental aspect of European colonial adventuring in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It remains as the underpinning aspect of contemporary colonialism. Its overt features (invasion of sovereign states, economic imperialism) remain the principal subject of contention. This leaves a more inimical spacing process unheeded (or, this inimical spacing process is not adequately theorized in terms of its relation to contemporary colonialism). This oversight, if it is an oversight, enables the ongoing process of place-making against the most marginal and vulnerable. If we are to articulate the claims of those marginalized and vulnerable groups as resounding political and moral claims that intrude into and unsettle the foreclosing boundaries of contemporary polities, then we must first begin by thinking the (very colonial) process of legitimization and delegitimzation that establishes the border as a limit concept differentiating belonging from nonbelonging.
It is of fundamental importance that the aestheticization of the polity that is part and parcel of this colonial spacing process I have identified makes, by default, the polity's overarching goal to be order and its maintenance. Order, not justice. This arises from a remarkable sleight of hand. We have come to think of justice and order in closely related terms: in terms of the maintenance of a society and what it represents (that absent metaphysical framework to which Timothy Mitchell has pointed so effectively). This is a stultifying aesthetics, where what is fundamentally being imposed is a way of orienting the future and restricting what it is to be human. Thinking justice, on the other hand, necessarily questions the imposition of stultifying orders and identifies those elements and groups it serves. It identifies the colonial present in ongoing processes of polity formation and maintenance in the contemporary world.
The creation of borders is a political act that reinforces the politics of exclusion – this is the basis for all violence
Laitenen – Professor of Political Science at Oulu University in Finland – 2001 (Kari, International Journal of Peace Studies 6.2, “Reflecting the Security Border in the Post Cold War Context,” www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol6_2/Laitinen.htm)
In the world of present threats the security border and the principle (practice) of sovereignty are not solutions but mainly problems. According to traditional thinking the violence itself is merely a strategic tool of power politics. The postmodern security orientation argues, how violence actually creates the state and preconditions for its existence (Der Derian 1995; Campbell&Dillon 1993, 16 ¾ state as subject of control). The concept of postmodern is understood here as an orientation, which questions the Western thought on control and dominance. In other words, the studies focus on how the doctrines regarding the necessities of the reality (ontologies) and paradigmatic (pre)sumptions dominate others and restrict us. It follows that the truth is an element of the social order, which is upheld with the help of knowledge-practices. In the context of security border the postmodern orientation underlines how the geopolitical thinking of the past reproduces the present and generates simplified truths of it. It is essential to see that the violence is not only a functional dimension of the state, but the crucial element of the ontological construction of the state. Sovereignty and its outcome border was created as protection against violence (chaos). Consequently, at the very core of the state is the element of violence (see Connolly 1994, 19-40). Violence in the form of fear and threat provides both the cause and the need to build a certain kind of security construction (state) with exclusive national security borders (violence creates controllability ¾ order instead of chaos). In other words, strategic violence does not only patrol the borders of the state, but also creates them. Furthermore, the strategic violence is ongoing process, where it is defined the borders of the state based on the exclusion and inclusion (Klein 1994, 1-12, 139;Neufeld 1995, 61). Therefore, the criticism against state-centrism leads to the ultimatum for change, because the modern condition or political space does not allow more human and peaceful politics. The studies focusing on the state, the security border, and the security space should concentrate on those ways according which the world is divided. The way the (political) world looks is a sum of intentions, contingency and active participation. The argument goes that the present way of understanding the world is not final, but, on the contrary, it includes various possibilities. The creation of borders is thus, before all else, the political act. A state as political, economic and cultural container has three different goals: as a power container it tries to preserve existing boundaries, as a container of wealth it strives for larger territories, and as a cultural container it tends towards smaller territories. Therefore, the politics of the European Union can also be interpreted, in militaristic terms, for instance as an endeavour to "conquer" Russia. In this respect, it should be asked, what is "the other" for the EU? Is it Russia, Islam, or is it after all the tragic past of Europe, which is now written off? If this is the case, then the security border practice (mental security border map) of Europe is, first and foremost, the practice of traditional security thinking, which must be left behind. When it comes to the practices of security borders, the EU represents new security thinking.
Hence, the concept of integrating security border means a new approach in the field of international relations ¾ borders including the element of peaceful change without the practice of producing the other ¾ the security threat. The notion is based on the idea of security as a process, in which the goal and the means differ markedly of those of the Cold War era. Overall security is understood as a comprehensive concept, which means the pursuit of such practices which produce security in a lasting way without threatening the very foundation of humankind. In other words, security must be built on co-operative practices without exclusionist border-producing mechanisms. In the framework of European security politics it would mean seeing the European Union primarily as a civilian security actor.
Is this the OP from the "socialist world" thread?
>>24
Borders are between countries with different laws.
Hello, mysterious long poster returning.
In summary:
The concept of borders are so entreched in our minsd that we can hardly even discuss the world without referring to them.
The alternative is to reject the very notion of borders and begin envisioning what the world might be like without them.
Oh but it's much better now than 60 years ago.
We've entered a kind of post-Westphalian stage where the old notion of an autonomous sovereign state is rather obsolete. Instead we have these kinds of "market-states" kinds of amorphous, semi-corporate bodies collaborating and consolidating resources, like the EU, North America, and despite some political friction, East Asian states for the most part are economically inseparable.
This is ironically a situation similar (although under very different circumstances) to the ones envisioned by various early 20th century political idealists when talking about unified economic blocs, like the "Greater-East-Asia-Co-Prosperity Sphere", or the unified world socialism of Marx-Leninists. Big difference is that they're not racially/nationally-defined and they're not mercantile in any way, but inter-dependent and globalised.
Still, I think you have to give Pax-Americana a lot of credit for this. If political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, as Mao would say, can you keep your happy unified world going smoothly without that powerful military presence as leader of the co-prosperity sphere?
lol.
>>28
I tried rejecting them but then I noticed that countries had trouble enforcing their multitudes of different laws and had to re-enstate checkpoints, customs etc... so that they could maintain some level of justice. Looks like your marxist fantasy world is just that after all but you are not intelligent enough to notice.
The idea of everyone putting aside race and culture and coming together is absurd. Do you want to see African savages hacking off clitorises in Iceland or Muslim terrorists blowing up Shinto shrines in Japan? Multi-culturalism is a virus, and logic is the cure.
Viewing the world in black and white is a common feature of childhood, and sadly, many of us never outgrow it.
Easing arbitrary national boundaries will not lead to dark savage beasts despoiling our pure Aryan daughters, or Middle Eastern extremists exporting their explosive brand of gospel across the world. The new world order is not going to enforce homosexuality or stamp a '666' on your forehead. Get over your petty fear of the dark.
>>32
If you think every foreigner is the epitome of moral righteousness you are naive.
Do you realize how chaotic it would be? You would have a jillion foreigners on America's doorstep the day after the State takes over. I don't think you losers realize the huge difference in wealth between nations.
I invite >>32 to come to the western edge of Detroit, Michigan, right around where Six Mile Road meets Telegraph Avenue, and start walking east on Six Mile.
Anyone want to take any bets on how likely it is that he'll reach Livernois Avenue, or get any further than that, without the Crips or the Vice Lords or the Latin Counts or MS13 popping a few caps in his whitebread ass?
This is what "diversity" has brought us, and every day it brings us more of the same.
I never said that foreigners were the epitome of whatever. I just said they're not hellbent on stealing our vital fluids.
The modern day model of immigration is flawed because it's not politically correct to expect migrants to learn the host country's language and adopt its culture. This gets to be a problem when "honor killings" and female circumcision and a host of other horrors arrive in first world countries. First worlders feel they have higher callings in life than raising children. Immigrants will have many more children than natives, hence fears of Islamization and the majority becoming the minority.
Once upon a time, it was enough that the host country gave the migrants a better life, but nowadays migrants expect to be of equal economic status. Obviously, this is downright unrealistic. The natives have familial ties, a better grasp of the language, and many other advantages. The sheer sense of entitlement that immigrants feel is astounding.
>>38
It would require negligible levels of crime on either side of the border for borders to become obsolete. If you don't like borders you would want to declare that foreigners hardly ever commit crime and there is no point in maintaining borders. I used hyperbole to outline the absurdity of the idea that foreigners are practically crime free by declaring you believe them to be the "epitome of moral righteousness".
>it's not politically correct to expect migrants to learn the host country's language and adopt its culture.
>"honor killings" and female circumcision and a host of other horrors arrive in first world countries
>First worlders feel they have higher callings in life than raising children
>Immigrants will have many more children than natives,
>entitlement that immigrants
I don't know where to begin, your world view is so horrifically broken. To start, you seem to have an out-of-proportion view of political correctness. It's nothing to do with being a fucking pushover, it's simply not calling your black coworkers "boy." Political correctness doesn't demand we respect a man's decision to wear a cocktail dress at work, or accomodate someone who refuses to learn the local language. Seriously, who sold it to you as some sort of culture-destroying boogeyman?
Honor-killings and female circumcision are symptoms of tribalism. Urban camel-jockeys who have to worry about the health insurance and rent engage in these behaviors at a much lower rate than rural ones. It's so rare among immigrants that American xenophobes are still gabbing about the one that happened a decade ago.
Fertility is lower among North Americans and West Europeans because medical care is good and sex education is high. That "higher calling" stuff is bullshit. I'm a middle-class asshole trying to get into the IT industry and get a comfy job, but my real aspiration is a white-picket fence and a kid or two. It's no coincidence that the Americans who keep dropping crotch-fruit are the ones with little or no schooling. Any immigrants who come here, their children will spend a year or so in ESOL, get mainstreamed for the rest of their education, and grow up to join the workforce and buy condoms.
Basically, not all immigrants will have more kids, and those who do, will cut that shit out by the first generation.
And yes, some immigrants have entitlement complexes, but that generally gets smacked out of them.
Let me tell you a story: when Irish immigrants first came to the United States, they were decried as "white niggers;" viewed as sub-human, even African-Americans bitched about their savagery. People whined about their backwards customs, reluctance to adopt American customs, and higher birthrate. A lot of honkies were convinced they were a threat to genteel American society.
Now, no one gives a shit about Irish Americans. Irish men marry white women all the time without a fuss being kicked up. One day, your grandchildren will fail to have nightmares about towel-headed savages and castration. So shut up.
PS: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_Irish_Need_Apply
(lest you somehow get it into your pointy head I'm full of shit)
>>46
Some racial classifications are pseudoscientific. Others are scientific.
How is hating on poor immigrants from Ireland different than hating on poor immigrants from anywhere else? Is it because your mother and father raised you to believe the Irish were white?
Ugh, stop digressing off topic with this Irish, crap. Take it elsewhere. This thread is about open borders and the One State, okay.
>>48
I thought we were discussing the scientific basis for race?
>>49
A world government would need to be oppressive since not everyone agrees with each other.
>>51
Let's say you have a strong world government like say the US already set up; we are past the initial war period where you can expect guerilla warfare and rebellions. All you would need is a strong police force then, right? If you have a democracy and fairly independent provinces (no armies, obviously, and you have global laws to follow) then the rate of revolts should not be too high.
The laws can be the same as what's in the US right now, except the provinces can't go independent (which no state in the US can do anyway considering history) Can't have armies forming out in the country-side. The world is big enough though that there are going to be isolated settlements but it's not like the government would have to even contact them. So I don't see a world government as necessarily being oppressive.
>>52
"we are past the initial war period where you can expect guerilla warfare and rebellions."
That sounds oppressive.
>>53
Fine, how about cultural take-over then? What I meant was that once you have a world government, through whatever means, it doesn't have to any different from the liberal democracies that we have today.
The Irish weren't blowing people up. /end discussion.
At least muslims blow themselves up.