I've decided that since this arguement relies heavily on science (and since there are other philosophical topics on this board) to move this discussion from the General board to here.
Ok, let's get serious!
It's obvious who I'm replying to if you read the old thread.
>Where you believe I have accepted a false dichotomy, I believe you are continuously contradicting yourself.
Do you have any reason for this belief? What do you think of Nozick's thermostat example?
>For the issue of whether the balls on the table are "altered" or not, I believe that's just an issue of semantics
They are altered. Their nature (velocity) changes because of their interactions. This is a (meta)physical issue, methinks.
>Remember, a mind is made up of particles just like balls on a table, the only difference is that they are configured in such a way that they give self awareness, and the appearance of will, but these particles are still subject to all of the same laws as matter everywhere.
Correction: actual will.
>So tell me, what is the special process that you believe occurs, in total violation of the laws of physics, that allows a "conscious" mind (essentially made up of billiard balls) to be able to "choose" to manipulate matter in some way that balls on a table are not?
There is no violation. Volition is a kind of causality, not an exception to it (to paraphrase Leonard Peikoff (uh-oh!)).
This is choice:
-I have beliefs and desires (my brain is arranged a certain way due to new sensory input, and prior influences)
-I consciously assess various ideas for what action to take, according to my goals, beliefs and desires (brain does stuff with itself, resulting in 'thought')
-I come to a conclusion, the decision is now made (my brain has changed part of its identity)
(then, hopefully, I act upon my decision)
That's what choice is, that's all it is (in general terms, I mean, since you could look deeper into neurology and break the steps down further). That the mental depends on the physical does not take anything away.
Billiard tables are not conscious.
I'm not familiar with Nozick's thermostat example, could you provide a link?
You're still making a leap of logic though. You are reasoning as though the concept of self is different from and not dependent on the same matter and laws of physics that your brain is.
>I have beliefs and desires.
Agreed.
>I consciously assess various ideas for what action to take, according to my goals, beliefs and desires
Agreed, somewhat. You have the apperance of doing this, in your mind you are weighing benefits of outcomes, etc. But even this process is governed by the laws of physics acting on the particles that make up your mind.
>I come to a conclusion, the decision is now made
You have the feeling of having made a decision, but in reality this is the only outcome that could have possibly occured. Because the particles of your mind that are involved in all the decision making are still governed by the laws of physics your final "decision" is no more a product of choice than one ball striking another on a pool table. The interactions of the particles of your mind and the balls on the table are all governed by the same laws of physics, and nothing can change that.
Now I suppose if you believed in an immaterial soul/consciousness that somehow affected the material parts of your brain so that they were not ultimately just balls on a table, then free will is a possibility. But if you believe that, then you also have to accept the possibility of telekinesis and telepathy (your immaterial mind affecting the material world.)
> You have the feeling of having made a decision, but in reality this is the only outcome that could have possibly occured. Because the particles of your mind that are involved in all the decision making are still governed by the laws of physics your final "decision" is no more a product of choice than one ball striking another on a pool table. The interactions of the particles of your mind and the balls on the table are all governed by the same laws of physics, and nothing can change that.
As an aside, it is not known whether the laws of physics are deterministic. Most of them are, but the concept of "waveform collapse" in qunatum physics is still poorly understood, and appears as if it might not be deterministic, but entirely random.
Even if the laws of physics are deterministic, this does not mean the future is knowable. Dynamic, chaotic systems have the property that small changes grow exponentially, and thus any uncertainty in the knowledge of the initial state of a system will grow and destroy the possibility of predicting the future of said system. As perfect knowledge of the initial conditions is impossible to acquire due to quantum uncertainty, even deterministic systems are essentially unpredictable.
In summary, the universe is simply not clockwork and billiard balls. How any of this applies to the concept of free will is as yet undetermined, however.
>>4
If you read the original thread, you'd see that the original post states that the universe is in fact not deterministic due to the randomness associated with quantum physics. There was even an example with a quantum billiard ball.
When I said
>this is the only outcome that could have possibly occured
That's not taking quantum physics into account for the moment. If you do take that into account, then there are in fact, multiple outcomes that could occur, but you are still equally powerless to "choose" any of them.
Well, let's play it this way: Can you define a test that can determine if a an entity has free will, or not? As an example of what I'm talking about, and to clarify my earlier statements, one part of such a test might be:
If you can perfectly predict what that entity will do under any given circumstance, it cannot be really be said to have free will.
My earlier statement was to point out that even in a completely deterministic, non-quantum universe, this test would fail. What other requirements would you put on free will?
In a completely deterministic universe, I believe you would (theoretically) be able to perfectly predict what any entity would do under any given circumstances. This is called Isaac Newton's "Clockwork Universe" theory, and it does negate the presence of free will.
The existence of the inherent randomness in quantum physics negates the possibility of a Clockwork Universe, but only in the sense that nothing can be perfectly predicted (only predicted in terms of probabilities.) It still does not leave any room for free will though.
> In a completely deterministic universe, I believe you would (theoretically) be able to perfectly predict what any entity would do under any given circumstances. This is called Isaac Newton's "Clockwork Universe" theory, and it does negate the presence of free will.
This is indeed what Newton believed, and it would indeed disprove free will, but it is incorrect. As I said, dynamic systems can, and very often do, propagate errors exponentially. What this means is that any error in the knowledge of the initial conditions, no matter how small, will fairly quickly grow to affect the entire system. This is one of the more important discoveries of chaos theory. It is what is more commonly known as the butterfly effect.
This means that to predict the outcome of a system over arbitarily long timescales requires infinite knowledge of the initial conditions, and this is impossible to acquire, if for no other reason than that the universe is finite, and you could not fit the information inside it. Thus, even an entirely Newtonian, deterministic universe is unpredictable.
>any error in the knowledge of the initial conditions, no matter how small, will fairly quickly grow to affect the entire system.
That's why it's only possible to theoretically predict the outcome of any event, rather than practically possible. You can't say that the future isn't deterministic just because we can't ever gather enough information to predict it. Your lack of knowledge of the initial conditions doesn't alter the fact that those conditions do indeed exist. I don't know how many jelly-beans are in the jar, and there may be far too many to count, but that doesn't alter the fact that there is indeed a specific number in the jar.
No, you can't just assume you have supernatural powers, not even "in theory". If that is allowed, you could just say you are omniscient and thus know exactly what anyone will do, and thus there can be no free will. You have to play by the rules of the world we live in.
There is nothing fundamental about the universe that stops you from knowing the number of jellybeans in a jar. However, there are many things, absolutely fundamental to the universe, that stop you from knowing the exact intial conditions of any system.
>I'm not familiar with Nozick's thermostat example, could you provide a link?
I don't have any link for it, sorry. I read it in a philosophy for newbies book :)
>You're still making a leap of logic though. You are reasoning as though the concept of self is different from and not dependent on the same matter and laws of physics that your brain is.
This is very... abstract. If I've made a logical mistake, please tell me where, exactly.
>(ME)I consciously assess various ideas for what action to take, according to my goals, beliefs and desires
>Agreed, somewhat. You have the apperance of doing this,
Not just an appearance, I'm actually doing this!
>in your mind you are weighing benefits of outcomes, etc.
Yes, it is in my mind - where else would mental activity take place?
>But even this process is governed by the laws of physics acting on the particles that make up your mind.
So what? You can break it down into its components if you like, but it still is what it is.
>You have the feeling of having made a decision, but in reality this is the only outcome that could have possibly occured.
Yes, but the fact remains that it occured because I made it happen.
>Because the particles of your mind that are involved in all the decision making are still governed by the laws of physics your final "decision" is no more a product of choice than one ball striking another on a pool table.
No no noooo! No mental activity -> no choice. Put the snooker balls away, please ;_;
You agreed with my definition of choice. Right? Now we're just going over how it works (or doesn't) in a physical universe.
>The interactions of the particles of your mind and the balls on the table are all governed by the same laws of physics, and nothing can change that.
I'm not saying anything changes that, I'm saying that choice is a natural, normal part of that. For conscious humans, that is.
>Now I suppose if you believed in an immaterial soul/consciousness that somehow affected the material parts of your brain so that they were not ultimately just balls on a table, then free will is a possibility.
Good Heavens no, there's no need for that! But even if that was true, that wouldn't give you a free ticket to free will. If souls had specific identities, and interacted with bodies in a causal fashion, then they would be able to command the body only in one specific way at any one time. They'd just become another part of nature. Another type of ball on the table.
QUESTION! Do you agree with this statement: an apple falls to the ground because of its mass and Earth's gravity.
I like the clockwork universe ...
>No, you can't just assume you have supernatural powers, not even "in theory". If that is allowed, you could just say you are omniscient and thus know exactly what anyone will do, and thus there can be no free will. You have to play by the rules of the world we live in.
That sounds like 'logical determinism'. Statements about the future are true or false, therefore the future is something specific, set in stone. I agree with the conclusion, but there's something intuitively irksome about the reasoning...
I think we may have been arguing over issues of semantics again. In an earlier post you said (I believe it was you at least)
>Free will: will not bound to external causality (e.g. influence of environment, genetics, upbringing, stock market). When person A does action B, and it was the case that he could have NOT done B, he acted with free will.
Do you believe there is ever a situation where person A could have not done action B? Because my problem with the concept of "choice" is that if it exists then person A could have chosen to not do action B and exercised his free will. If there is no free will though, person A could never have chosen not to do action B, therefore he really had no choice in the matter to begin with. That's why I've been arguing that the concept of choice is just an illusion.
Oh, and in answer to your question, yes I agree that an apple falls to the ground because of an attractive force between bodies of matter known as "gravity."
Just to clarify, we're still talking about a deterministic universe, not a universe with quantum physics.
I did not invoke any sort of supernatural ability. What I am saying is that just because you do not know (or perhaps cannot know) every property of every particle in the universe, does not mean that those properties do not exist in absolute form. In a deterministic universe, they do. (In our actual quantum physics universe, they do not.)
> That sounds like 'logical determinism'. Statements about the future are true or false, therefore the future is something specific, set in stone. I agree with the conclusion, but there's something intuitively irksome about the reasoning...
I think saying that statements are "either true or false", about the future or anything else, is far too simplistic.
>Do you believe there is ever a situation where person A could have not done action B?
If A actually did B, no.
>Because my problem with the concept of "choice" is that if it exists then person A could have chosen to not do action B and exercised his free will.
I disagree. Choice has nothing to do with free will.
>If there is no free will though, person A could never have chosen not to do action B, therefore he really had no choice in the matter to begin with.
I disagree.
>That's why I've been arguing that the concept of choice is just an illusion.
If your concept of choice involves free will then I don't want anything to do with it. I gave my awesome definition already ;_;
>Oh, and in answer to your question, yes I agree that an apple falls to the ground because of an attractive force between bodies of matter known as "gravity."
Awesome.
>I think saying that statements are "either true or false", about the future or anything else, is far too simplistic.
I think it's perfectly valid and necessary to make sense of reality. If existing things are something specific, then claims about them, if they make sense, must be true or false. If reality can be in some 'undetermined' state then... things get messy.
> I think it's perfectly valid and necessary to make sense of reality. If existing things are something specific, then claims about them, if they make sense, must be true or false. If reality can be in some 'undetermined' state then... things get messy.
First, reality is messy. It's a whole lot more fucked up than your everyday intuition leads you to believe. This is an important lesson of modern physics. It is sadly lost on most people, for the simple reason that modern physics is quite inaccessible, and popularizations of it are too simplified to communicate any of the real concepts involved, or just plain wrong.
But even without invoking reality as such you can easily see that not all statements are true or false. Paradoxes like "this statement is false" are neither, obviously. You qualify your statement with "if they make sense", but if you do that, I can easily claim that any statement about the future does not "make sense".
>I disagree. Choice has nothing to do with free will.
How can you say that? Free will is defined as, and I'll quote from the dictionary here,
The doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces. Personal Choice.
What was the purpose behind your question about the apple anyway?
>Paradoxes like "this statement is false" are neither, obviously. You qualify your statement with "if they make sense", but if you do that, I can easily claim that any statement about the future does not "make sense".
How about qualifying them with "If they are not logically contradictory"? You can't say "A=notA." (Well you can say it, but it will never be true.)
>First, reality is messy.
Yeah. But it has to at least be itself. If that wasn't true then physics would be impossible.
>But even without invoking reality as such you can easily see that not all statements are true or false. Paradoxes like "this statement is false" are neither, obviously.
"this statement is false" refers only to itself... it's not saying anything about reality.
>You qualify your statement with "if they make sense", but if you do that, I can easily claim that any statement about the future does not "make sense".
But... it does D:
Just a P.S. from >>17,
I believe I understand what you are saying/have been saying, but I think I disagree with your definition of "choice" (and I think many people would, based on the definition of "free will" I posted.) It just took me awhile to realize what your definition was. Even though you had already tried to explain it, it took me awhile to actually get it. Since it was similar in concept to my definition I was thinking it was just the same.
>How can you say that?
I have given my definition of choice several times already. Here it is again:
This is choice:
-I have beliefs and desires
-I consciously assess various ideas for what action to take, according to my goals, beliefs and desires
-I come to a conclusion, the decision is now made
No free will necessary.
>Free will is defined as, and I'll quote from the dictionary here
Don't bother. I'm not interested in free will. I am interested in choice. My dictionaries have not been useful there... defining it as 'selection', and then defining selection as the act of 'choice'.
>What was the purpose behind your question about the apple anyway?
To make sure you agree that entities interact with each other causally.
>>19
It's all good. I didn't invent it though. I stole it from Aristotle. And probably butchered it a bit too. He didn't bother with free will :)
> Just to clarify, we're still talking about a deterministic universe, not a universe with quantum physics.
Indeed.
> I did not invoke any sort of supernatural ability. What I am saying is that just because you do not know (or perhaps cannot know) every property of every particle in the universe, does not mean that those properties do not exist in absolute form. In a deterministic universe, they do.
But do they? They are entirely unknowable and unexpressible. Can they really be said to exist?
Either way, as they cannot be known, and thus the future cannot be predicted except by letting it happen, free will passes the test I set forward in >>6.
I figure the problem here is having a working definition of "free will". What I tried starting in >>6 is putting forward some tests for free will, and working towards a definition that way. Can you suggest some other test that would either confirm or deny free will?
> (In our actual quantum physics universe, they do not.)
This statement shouldn't be put forward as fact - our quantum-mechanical laws of the universe are entirely deterministic, too. Through some process that is not understood (and usually referred to as "waveform collapse"), apparently non-deterministic behaviour sneaks in somehow. It is not yet clear why this is, as far as I know.
> How about qualifying them with "If they are not logically contradictory"? You can't say "A=notA." (Well you can say it, but it will never be true.)
If there is ONE qualifier, then maybe there are TWO. Maybe there are a million. Maybe one of them is "if they are not about events which have not yet come to pass" (with some relativistically sound definition of "come to pass"). Either way, it's obvious that statements are not simply true or false in every single case.
>>You qualify your statement with "if they make sense", but if you do that, I can easily claim that any statement about the future does not "make sense".
> But... it does D:
Can you justify that based on anything other than intuition? Intuition fails quite severely when discussing certain parts of reality. (For instance, I am sure you, or at least most people, think that events can happen at the same time at different places, even though this turns out not to be the case.)
Just another comment on your definition of choice. I (and most people probably,) would say a choice inherently implies selection from alternatives, where as your definition seems to simply describe taking an action. I see choice as being inextricably linked with free will, because without free will, there are no alternatives from which to choose.
>Can they really be said to exist?
Yes, we can. We can see the effects of their existance. That a particle behaves in a certain way is proof that there were absolute initial conditions acting on it, even if we can't perfectly determine what those conditions were.
>This statement shouldn't be put forward as fact
Well it's a fact as far as it conforms to our current best understanding of how things work. Should new information be discovered in the future, this statement could be revised, but until then it is as accurate as describing any other natural process to the best of our current ability.
>Either way, it's obvious that statements are not simply true or false in every single case.
Please show a real world example in which something is both true and false. Of course statements themselves can be phrased in ways that they are both true and false (or neither true nor false) but they are logically inconsistent and have no real meaning.
The Law of Contradiction (or Law of Noncontradiction) says that propositions about things cannot be both true and false. It's considered to be one of philosophy's fundamental Laws of Thought. (Incidentally, another one of the Laws of Thought says every proposition is either true or false.)
> Please show a real world example in which something is both true and false.
I never said they could be. I was implying that there are more possiblities than simply "true" and "false".
My argument here is that if the justification for the statement "all statements about the future are either true or false" is that "all statements are true or false", then that justification is demonstratably wrong, as there are statements that are neither true nor false. As an example of such statements, I present self-contradictory ones. There is no need to give any further examples, but such may very well exist.
If the justification is some other one, another argument will have to be made, but I have not seen one given so I just picked the simplest one. Either way, the statement needs justification of some sort.
> Incidentally, another one of the Laws of Thought says every proposition is either true or false.
You will have to give a very tricky definition for "proposition" in order for this to be true. What would that definition be? Would it include statements about the future?
Oh, almost forgot:
>>Can they really be said to exist?
> Yes, we can. We can see the effects of their existance.
Actually, we can't - measuring the state of the system at any point is equivalent to knowing its state at any earlier or later time, and we can't do that. We can't measure the initial condition, and we can't measure the later condition either. It remains forever out of reach.
We can see that something happens, but we can't tell exactly what at any time.
>As an example of such statements, I present self-contradictory ones. There is no need to give any further examples,
Sorry, that won't cut it. A self contradictory statement is essentially nonsense, and has no meaning. To prove that something can be both true and false (or neither true nor false) you're going to have to show me a real example.
>You will have to give a very tricky definition for "proposition" in order for this to be true
No, I believe the standard definition will suffice. Any statement about something is either true or false (nonsensical self-contradicting statements notwithstanding, because they essentially have no meaning.) Can this apply to statements about the future? Absolutely. Example:
Socrates is mortal.
Therefore, either Socrates is mortal, or he is not. (Either he will die, or he won't die. Statements about the future.) Socrates cannot be both mortal and immortal at the same time, nor can he be neither (the two conditions are mutually exclusive, and collectively exhaustive.)
>We can see that something happens, but we can't tell exactly what at any time
That doesn't matter, the fact that it is happening at all is proof that there were absolute initial conditions, and absolute current conditions, regardless of whether or not they can be perfectly determined by us.
> No, I believe the standard definition will suffice. Any statement about something is either true or false (nonsensical self-contradicting statements notwithstanding, because they essentially have no meaning.)
Circular reasoning. Proving that a statement is not self-contradictory can be very, very hard. It is certainly not enough to simply state something that looks like it is probably true or false, as any statement you make also rests on a huge foundation of other assumptions, axioms and definitions. Contradictions can be excruciatingly subtle.
So you've basically just shifted the problem into one where you have to first exhaustively prove that any statement you make about the future is in fact a valid statement, which I would claim is nearly impossible. I'm pretty sure you'll start running into trouble when you get to the part about the definition of the future.
> That doesn't matter, the fact that it is happening at all is proof that there were absolute initial conditions, and absolute current conditions, regardless of whether or not they can be perfectly determined by us.
No, as we cannot tell exactly what is happening, it cannot be a valid proof.
>Circular reasoning.
How do you figure?
>Proving that a statement is not self-contradictory can be very, very hard.
It doesn't seem that hard to me. Again, can you give an example?
>No, as we cannot tell exactly what is happening, it cannot be a valid proof.
Again, absolute truth does not need to be absolutely known in order to exist.
>> Circular reasoning.
> How do you figure?
"Every statement about the future that is true or false is true or false" doesn't seem circular to you?
>> Proving that a statement is not self-contradictory can be very, very hard.
> It doesn't seem that hard to me. Again, can you give an example?
How about proving that the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory are not contradictory? Nobody's done it yet, and they've had over a hundred years to work on it.
To further illustrate my reasoning, let's take two statements about the future:
It's pretty easy to see that the second one is not really a statement that is either true or false - lacking a strict definition of "awesome", it cannot be said to have any objective meaning.
But what is the difference between the two? Can you really prove that the first is strictly different from the second?
>"Every statement about the future that is true or false is true or false" doesn't seem circular to you?
I believe what I said was "Every statement about the future is true or false" period.
>How about proving that the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory are not contradictory?
I looked that up, and honestly, I'm having a hard time understanding what they even are, let alone trying to prove something about them.
>But what is the difference between the two? Can you really prove that the first is strictly different from the second?
I believe I can. "Socrates is mortal" can be verified as being true or false. "Tomorrow is going to be awesome" is based on an opinion. It's saying tomorrow will be better than some days. To say that any one thing is "better" than any other thing though is totally meaningless, just as it is meaningless to state with certainty that "This statement is false." It does accomplish the goal of explaining your opinion about something, just as "This statement is false" accomplishes the goal of showing what a logical contradiction looks like, but as far as describing events about the universe (events like whether or not Socrates will die, a physical process that can be measured) it is an utterly meaningless statement.
> I believe what I said was "Every statement about the future is true or false" period.
But then you qualified it by saying that "statement" only includes statements which are either true or false.
> I looked that up, and honestly, I'm having a hard time understanding what they even are, let alone trying to prove something about them.
They are the basis of modern mathematics, pretty much. Actually, to give you the whole story, Gödel proved they cannot be proved to be non-contradictory (they could of course be proven to be contradictory by example, but nobody has found such an example).
So: Proving non-contradictoriness is not easy in every case, and in some cases is entirely impossible.
> I believe I can. "Socrates is mortal" can be verified as being true or false.
To verify it, you have to first define it strictly. That means you'll first have to define what it means to be alive. I don't expect you to have much luck with that.
Basically, since you are trying to prove something about the workings of the universe itself here, you are not allowed to rely on common sense and everyday language, as none of those apply to the universe. You have to define everything in terms of references to objective reality, or your argument will fall apart. And I doubt it is possible to do this.
>But then you qualified it by saying that "statement" only includes statements which are either true or false.
No, what I said was
>Any statement about something is either true or false (nonsensical self-contradicting statements notwithstanding)
To be more clear, I should have said nonsensical statements notwithstanding period. Because if you're saying something that has no meaning it can't be true or false anymore than "banana pants" is true or false.
>You have to define everything in terms of references to objective reality, or your argument will fall apart.
Thank goodness that's exactly what science is for. It describes everything in terms of objective reality, a definition of life being included in that.
Life: Any organism (i.e. an arrangement of matter) that undergoes metabolism, possesses a capacity to grow, responds to stimuli, and reproduces.
As soon as Socrates ceases to posses these qualities, he is no longer alive. I could break down these qualities into further more specific descriptions of the processes in objective terms, although it would be time consuming.
> To be more clear, I should have said nonsensical statements notwithstanding period. Because if you're saying something that has no meaning it can't be true or false anymore than "banana pants" is true or false.
Yes, but as I pointed out, it is very, very hard to tell if a statement is nonsensical or not, even if it is expressed in exact mathematical language. Doing it for something expressed in vague, inexact natural language is not likely to be any easier.
> Life: Any organism (i.e. an arrangement of matter) that undergoes metabolism, possesses a capacity to grow, responds to stimuli, and reproduces.
> As soon as Socrates ceases to posses these qualities, he is no longer alive. I could break down these qualities into further more specific descriptions of the processes in objective terms, although it would be time consuming.
You would have to, because they are still extremely vague. There are any number of possible border cases. Just try looking into the kind of discussions you can find about what does and does not constitute "life", and possible complications to the question that could arise in the future, as technology progresses.
Basically: If you want to argue that the future is predetermined because "all statements about the future are either true or false", you will first have to be able to prove the following things:
This seems a tall order.
Earlier you said
>Proving that a statement is not self-contradictory can be very, very hard.
This is only true in the same way that proving the nonexistance of something is very, very hard. (In fact, it is actually impossible.)
This does not, however, mean that:
>It is very, very hard to tell if a statement is nonsensical or not
Just because it is impossible to prove that something nonexistant is actually nonexistant, this does not mean it is hard to prove whether or not things exist.
In the same way, just because it may be impossible to prove that a sensical statement is always sensical, this does not mean it is hard to prove that statements are nonsensical.
>You would have to, because they are still extremely vague.
I hardly think that is vague, but okay, let's break it down (in a general way.) Matter has certain conformations that we refer to in our language as "being alive." Matter also has certain conformations that we refer to in our language as "not being alive." Matter may also have certain conformations that we do not have language to properly refer to as "alive" or "not alive," however this does not alter the fact that the matter in these conformations has absolute properties. The only downfall is in our ability to accurately describe it, not in the existance of the conformations themselves. Their existance is absolute.
>You will first have to prove the following things:
>1. That any such statement is strictly and objectively true or false, and that there is not a single case where the truth or falsehood of said statement would be unclear.
I'm sorry, but proving things doesn't work that way. If I say I will not accept gravity as a constant unless you can prove to me that it is constant in every case, that would be ridiculous. To prove gravity is not constant, I would have to show you a case in which it is not constant. Similarly, you will have to show me a statement (an actual statement about actual things) in which the truth or falsehood is unclear.
>2. That the truth of such a statement can never change, no matter how much the world changes.
Well given that the universe is deterministic, (the original supposition of this entire thread,) the truth or falsehood of a statement about the future will never change. I was never trying to use this as an arguement to prove the universe is deterministic though. I was using the supposition that the universe is deterministic to prove that statements about the future are always absolutely true or false. (And statements about the present are always absolutely true or false, regardless of determinism.) Even in a nondeterministic universe, statements about the future are still either true or false, although their truth or falsehood may change as conditions change, thus violating your second criterion.
>3. That you can form such a statement for every single event throughout all of time.
Again, the burden of proof lies on you. You have to give me an event for which you cannot form such a statement.
> In the same way, just because it may be impossible to prove that a sensical statement is always sensical, this does not mean it is hard to prove that statements are nonsensical.
No, sometimes it is easy to prove that. But that does not matter, because sometimes it is not easy to do this. You can't just pick the easy ones.
> The only downfall is in our ability to accurately describe it,
And so, any statement that relies on our description of this, such as the one you made, also falls.
> I'm sorry, but proving things doesn't work that way.
I never said proving things in the general case works that way. I said that in the specific case where you want to argue that the future is predetermined, you have to follow stricter standards, or else your argument does not hold.
> Well given that the universe is deterministic, (the original supposition of this entire thread,) the truth or falsehood of a statement about the future will never change.
"Tomorrow will be as warm as today" is a statement about the future, that changes between true and false from day to day.
> Again, the burden of proof lies on you. You have to give me an event for which you cannot form such a statement.
I'm not entirely sure that is so. I am not the one who is making the claim that the future is predetermined.
Either way, though, we're kind of just wasting air arguing about a universe that does not really exist. Let's stop that, and discuss the real universe.
>"Tomorrow will be as warm as today" is a statement about the future, that changes between true and false from day to day.
Only because the referrent of "tomorrow" is changing. Not because the truthfulness or falseness is somehow being altered.
>Either way, though, we're kind of just wasting air arguing about a universe that does not really exist. Let's stop that, and discuss the real universe.
Alright, in the real universe, free will is nonexistant. Due to randomness inherent in quantum physics (particles exist with probabilities rather than absoluteness) the universe is not entirely deterministic, however the only thing that exists within the universe is matter and energy, and matter and energy react to one another according to absolute laws. We have to assume these laws are absolute, because how confusing would it be if the gravitational constant of the universe, or the speed of light were randomly changing from moment to moment? We wouldn't be able to predict anything at all. We wouldn't even be able to function in this universe. Because the laws affecting the interactions of matter and energy are absolute, there is no way to somehow use your "will" to affect matter.
I'll take this opportunity to quote something from a story that illustrates my point better than I probably can.
You believe in ghosts. The ghost in the machine. Every time you speak of the 'mind' or you claim to 'choose' what you do. These kids call it a soul, you call it your 'self' or 'personality.' Both of you are speaking of mysterious, ghostly things haunting a meaty, wet web of cells inside your skull. A force that somehow chooses to do one thing or another, to make one synapse fire instead of another. And you believe, despite knowing that the rest of the entire physical universe is nothing but a series of physical reactions, just pebbles bouncing down a board. The only object in fifteen billion light years in every direction that can choose rests inside the boney bowl atop your shoulders. Right?
> Only because the referrent of "tomorrow" is changing. Not because the truthfulness or falseness is somehow being altered.
Sure, but you never specified that that wasn't allowed in "All statements about the future are either true or false". But enough of that.
> Alright, in the real universe, free will is nonexistant. Due to randomness inherent in quantum physics (particles exist with probabilities rather than absoluteness) the universe is not entirely deterministic, however the only thing that exists within the universe is matter and energy, and matter and energy react to one another according to absolute laws.
And you believe the sum can never be greater than the parts?
>And you believe the sum can never be greater than the parts?
That would seem to be a physical impossibility to me. If you can offer a scientific explanation for how that could be, I'm eager to listen.
That's not to say I don't believe in emergent qualities, i.e. several brain cells grouped together can exhibit qualities that a single brain cell cannot (consciousness for example.) But to say that something can affect matter in violation of natural laws seems irrational to me.
How can you have consciousness without free will?
Also, do you then also believe in the consequences of a lack of free will?
Consciousness is simply being aware of yourself and your environment. Free will is being able to influence your behavior in a way that is not dictated by causal interactions. One does not require the other.
>Also, do you then also believe in the consequences of a lack of free will?
Maybe, it depends on which consequences you're referring to.
> Consciousness is simply being aware of yourself and your environment.
Consciousness would seem to imply at least having control over your own thoughts. If you do not have free will, you cannot have this control.
> Free will is being able to influence your behavior in a way that is not dictated by causal interactions.
Is it? Or are you merely defining it so narrowly that it cannot exist?
Me, I'd go as far as positing that free will and consciouness are one and the same.
>> Also, do you then also believe in the consequences of a lack of free will?
> Maybe, it depends on which consequences you're referring to.
That there can be no ethics, as people cannot choose to be good or evil. That there is no reason to do anything, as you can never affect anything. And so on.
>Consciousness would seem to imply at least having control over your own thoughts. If you do not have free will, you cannot have this control
That sounds about right. You have no more control over your own thoughts than you do over your own actions. That doesn't change the fact that you're aware of them though (consciousness.)
>Is it? Or are you merely defining it so narrowly that it cannot exist?
I'm using the standard dictionary definition here.
free will: noun, the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies
External agencies in this case are laws of physical interactions of matter and energy, and nothing is free of these constraints, including the matter and energy of your body and mind.
>That there can be no ethics, as people cannot choose to be good or evil.
That's about right. Morality and ethics, while meaningful concepts for our society, are nonexistant in terms of an objectively defined universe.
>That there is no reason to do anything, as you can never affect anything.
You can have an impact on your environment, but it's still out of your control. And regardless, whether you go out and live your life, or sit on the couch and do nothing, there's nothing that could have prevented it from being one way or the other. I don't see any benefit to sitting on my couch doing nothing, but that still doesn't mean I'm in true control of my actions when I do go out and live my life.
That's not to say I'm not to be held responsible for my actions either though.
> You have no more control over your own thoughts than you do over your own actions. That doesn't change the fact that you're aware of them though (consciousness.)
I find it very hard to see how you could be said to be conscious without being able to control your thoughts. And why what exactly is it that causes you to believe you are in control of them?
> I'm using the standard dictionary definition here.
"Standard"? Are you claiming there is a single universally agreed-upon definition? A quick search through dictionaries finds these definitions:
Several of these are far less strict than yours, and others depend on interpretations of the terms used.
>> That there can be no ethics, as people cannot choose to be good or evil.
> That's about right. Morality and ethics, while meaningful concepts for our society, are nonexistant in terms of an objectively defined universe.
No, if there is no free will, they are not useful for our society either, as they can not change a single thing that happens.
> I don't see any benefit to sitting on my couch doing nothing,
Just the concept of a benefit presumes free will, because it assumes there are choices where one is more beneficial than the other. If there is no free will, there is no benefit, as there is only a single path to follow, and it cannot be compared to any other.
> That's not to say I'm not to be held responsible for my actions either though.
How could you be repsonsible for actions that are not under your own control in any way? Since your actions are not, you are obviously not repsonsible for them.
>I find it very hard to see how you could be said to be conscious without being able to control your thoughts. And why what exactly is it that causes you to believe you are in control of them?
I don't really see a problem with it. You can be aware of yourself and your surroundings and still be powerless to consciously affect an outcome of any sort. As for why you appear to be in control of your thoughts and actions, I would imagine it has something to do with being aware of your environment, thoughts, and actions, but not being aware of every minute physical process within your brain. If you could somehow feel those processes, beginning with some external stimulus, and then trace the billions of synapses firing in order, and see how they are all essentially like a falling line of dominoes, eventually leading to an action, you would probably not be able to maintain the illusion of free will. Just imagine what it would be like to be conscious of every aspect of your thought process, on the cellular level (or even smaller,) there would be no mystery, no "soul" or "will" or anything we attempt to assign to our minds, it would be just observing physical reactions, and you would see how one action leads to another, leads to another, and so on.
>Several of these are far less strict than yours, and others depend on interpretations of the terms used.
Those all essentially say the same thing, worded in various ways. "The ability to choose."
>No, if there is no free will, they are not useful for our society either, as they can not change a single thing that happens
That's not true, if a society develops a moral code in order help that society flourish, then it is useful in the sense that the society benefits from enforcing it. Ethics are like a tool. Without free will I may not be able to choose to use a hammer, but there is still a chance I may use it. If the hammer does not exist though, there is zero chance I will use it. Society may not be able to "choose" to enforce a code of ethics, but that does not mean they won't. If the code isn't even available though, then it can't possibly be used. Since society benefits from having a code of ethics though, it makes sense to have one. Think of it as a kind of natural selection.
>Just the concept of a benefit presumes free will
>If there is no free will, there is no benefit, as there is only a single path to follow, and it cannot be compared to any other.
Think of it in terms of watching a movie. You can't alter the way it ends. That doesn't mean you can't judge the quality of the movie and determine if you thought it was good or not. Similarly, while you can't affect which path you're on, you can still determine if you think it's good (beneficial) or not.
>How could you be repsonsible for actions that are not under your own control in any way?
My physical form is responsible for my actions, because my physical form is what's committing them. If I act in a way beneficial to society, it's in society's best interest to reward me so that I may continue to act beneficially. If I act detrimentally to society, it's in society's best interest to punish me, so that I may cease acting detrimentally. Again, think of it as a kind of natural selection for behaviors of society. Societies that did not hold individuals responsible for their actions may have failed and died off, while societies that did hold individuals responsible for their actions have survived. That still doesn't mean the society is choosing to punish or not punish any more than an organism can choose to have physical traits that will be preferred in natural selection.
> Those all essentially say the same thing, worded in various ways. "The ability to choose."
Indeed. But then you seem to define "choose" as "act contrary to the laws of the universe", which does not really seem a useful definition.
> Since society benefits from having a code of ethics though, it makes sense to have one. Think of it as a kind of natural selection.
This argument does not really hold. Society has a code of ethics because people think they have free will. There is no selection process where societies without one are eliminated. The fact that it is beneficial is just a byproduct of the illusion of free will. Since that is just an illusion, ethics are completely arbitary.
> Think of it in terms of watching a movie. You can't alter the way it ends. That doesn't mean you can't judge the quality of the movie and determine if you thought it was good or not. Similarly, while you can't affect which path you're on, you can still determine if you think it's good (beneficial) or not.
No, you can't determine that, because you have no free will.
> My physical form is responsible for my actions, because my physical form is what's committing them.
Is a poisonous mushroom ethically repsonsible for killing a person who eats it? Is a bullet ethically reponsible for killing a person it is shot at? Is an asteroid ethically reponsible for killing the civilization it crashes into? Do we punish them for their actions? Without free will, you are no different.
>But then you seem to define "choose" as "act contrary to the laws of the universe"
I'm not the one who defines it that way, humanity is. Humanity seems to believe that in any situation, faced with alternatives A and B, they can freely choose either A, or B. In a universe govenered by physical laws, however, only one outcome is possible, just as a flipped coin can only land with one face up, as determined by the physical conditions acting on it. You cannot choose option A any more than a coin can choose to land heads up. Both outcomes are governed entirely by physical laws.
>There is no selection process where societies without one are eliminated.
You're thinking in terms of modern societies. Think further back on the evolutionary time-scale where organisms develop community-preserving behavior. Organisms survive better in communities than they do individually, therefore behaviors that preserve the community (just as ethics help preserve society) are favored by natural selection.
I do not disagree that ethics are objectively arbitrary, but in terms of society, there are certain values that help preserve that society, and that is what we have come to know as ethics.
>No, you can't determine that, because you have no free will.
I most certainly can determine that. Determination is just a physical process like walking, or breathing. To say I can't walk or breathe because I have no free will is ridiculous. To say I can't make a determination of an opinion because I have no free will is equally ridiculous. Lack of free will in no way limits my physical abilities, it merely limits my ability to choose.
>Is a poisonous mushroom ethically repsonsible for killing a person who eats it? Is a bullet ethically reponsible for killing a person it is shot at? Is an asteroid ethically reponsible for killing the civilization it crashes into? Do we punish them for their actions? Without free will, you are no different.
Think about that for a moment. Think of a rabid dog that kills someone. Do we not "punish" it for its actions by removing it from a position where it could do further harm?
If there was an asteroid that we knew with near certainty would cause massive death and destruction (severe damage to society) would we not "punish" it by attempting to destroy it and removing it from a position to cause harm?
There are several groups of people who would like to "punish" bullets by removing them from a position to do harm (by banning gun and ammunition sales.) Punishing a human is no different, he is simply being removed from a position to do harm to society (by being imprisoned, or in extreme cases executed.)
> I'm not the one who defines it that way, humanity is. Humanity seems to believe that in any situation, faced with alternatives A and B, they can freely choose either A, or B. In a universe govenered by physical laws, however, only one outcome is possible, just as a flipped coin can only land with one face up, as determined by the physical conditions acting on it.
Are you sure that you are not oversimplifying the matter? The physical processes involved are both incredibly complex, and their initial states unknowable. Their outcome is entirely unknowable. Out of this chaos has arisen an emergent system that in every way acts as though it has free will. Its behaviour may follow set laws, but in practice this is impossible to determine.
As said system behaves entirely as though it has free will, and not at all if it doesn't, does it not then make more sense to proceed on the assumption that it does have free will when building further arguments? Even though it may not be strictly true, the results gained from this line of reasoning much better fit reality than those gained from assuming the opposite.
> You're thinking in terms of modern societies. Think further back on the evolutionary time-scale where organisms develop community-preserving behavior.
Is morals are merely a matter of genetics, why do different societies of genetically similar people have different moral standards?
> I most certainly can determine that.
I should have quoted the part about "judging". Judging implies making a choice, and as you say, making choices is impossible.
> Punishing a human is no different, he is simply being removed from a position to do harm to society (by being imprisoned, or in extreme cases executed.)
So do you then support imprisoning people who are likely to commit acts harmful to society at some point in the future? As punishing people is merely a way to protect society, and not a question of principles, does it not make sense to take preventitive action before the harm is done? We do no wait until the asteroid hits the Earth before we try to remove it, we do it ahead of time, just as we deal with a dog that acts threateningly even before it actually attacks a human.
>Out of this chaos has arisen an emergent system that in every way acts as though it has free will.
I believe that it only "acts as though it has free will" because it is so complex we cannot currently comprehend its processes with any true amount of accuracy. As you say, its behavior does follow set laws, and to me, that is the bottom line. Nothing can alter the mind's behavior according to those laws, and therefore, free will does not truly exist. I imagine if we could map and quantify every process of the human mind, just as you could with balls on a pool table, or in a pachinko machine, we would no longer be able to maintain the illusion of free will. We would instead see an outside stimulus, leading to a chain reaction among a web of neurons, and ultimately a physical response. We can already do this with simpler processes such as reflex reactions.
Do you believe an insect has free will? That it can choose where it wants to walk, or what it wants to eat? There is a wonderful insect out there called the Sphex Wasp whose behavior lends strong evidence to the absence of free will in some organisms. If its environment is modified in a specific way, it becomes locked in a behavioral loop, repeating the same action over, and over, and over, until it eventually starves to death.
>Is morals are merely a matter of genetics, why do different societies of genetically similar people have different moral standards?
Could you give an example? Some minor moral aspects may change from civilization to civilization, but for the most part, "Do unto others" remains a constant moral guidepost for humanity.
>So do you then support imprisoning people who are likely to commit acts harmful to society at some point in the future?
Most civilizations hold the freedom of the individual to be more important than the well being of the group. The United States certainly does at least. As such, most would likely would not find this practice acceptable. In that situation, the act of protecting individual freedom protects societal function more than the imprisonment of people who are perceived as potential threats.
If it could be determined with absolute certainty that a certain person was going to commit a harmful act (just as it could be determined with absolute certainty that a meteor was going to strike the Earth,) then it would be a much more complex issue. In fact, this was the entire premise of the film "Minority Report." As for my personal views, I admit I don't know how I would feel about that kind of situation.
Hey. I come back here and find you're (collectively) making the same mistake. This is annoying!
Choice does not require free will.
> I imagine if we could map and quantify every process of the human mind, just as you could with balls on a pool table, or in a pachinko machine, we would no longer be able to maintain the illusion of free will.
But we can't. And not just because of technical limitations, but because of the very properties of mathematics and physics. It is quite literally impossible to do so, now or ever, given any amount of resources, up to and including the entire universe.
And you didn't respond to the gist of my argument, which was: As said system behaves entirely as though it has free will, and not at all if it doesn't, does it not then make more sense to proceed on the assumption that it does have free will when building further arguments? For instance, the moral arguments we have discussed elsewhere?
> Could you give an example? Some minor moral aspects may change from civilization to civilization, but for the most part, "Do unto others" remains a constant moral guidepost for humanity.
Would you really claim that, for instance, a caste system falls under "do unto others"? For that matter, do you think that punishment of criminals, as discussed earlier, falls under "do unto others"?
> Most civilizations hold the freedom of the individual to be more important than the well being of the group.
But this is also a moral stance. As you seem claim moral stances are entirely utilitarian due to being evolved to protect society, why would we evolve the stance to "value the freedom of the individual" when doing so prevents us from protecting society?
>But we can't. And not just because of technical limitations, but because of the very properties of mathematics and physics. It is quite literally impossible to do so, now or ever, given any amount of resources, up to and including the entire universe.
You may not be able to do it with absolute certainty, but I don't see any reason we would not be able to develop technology and methods to do it with reasonable certainty. And even if you could not predict with 100% accuracy, that is not to say that you are somehow choosing an alternate path, the end result is still determined by absolute physical laws.
>Would you really claim that, for instance, a caste system falls under "do unto others"? For that matter, do you think that punishment of criminals, as discussed earlier, falls under "do unto others"?
Even in a caste system, where the same personal freedoms do not exist for everyone, activities such as murder, rape, theft, etc. are still seen as criminal. And while these systems are functional, I think you and I would both agree that they are not optimal for societal function. That's why societies with caste systems are less developed than western societies such as the United States and western Europe.
As for punishment of criminals, the removal from society of someone who does not "do unto others" has an increased benefit over not removing them. Punishment of criminals is also another nearly universal societal trait of self preservation (among organisms we are familiar with at least) as I cannot think of any society that does not practice this.
>why would we evolve the stance to "value the freedom of the individual" when doing so prevents us from protecting society?
I already answered that previously by saying
>In that situation, the act of protecting individual freedom protects societal function more than the imprisonment of people who are perceived as potential threats
> You may not be able to do it with absolute certainty, but I don't see any reason we would not be able to develop technology and methods to do it with reasonable certainty.
I explained why, already. Even in completely deterministic systems, errors can (and in practice, will) grow exponentially, meaning the smallest deviation from a perfect measurement of the initial state will grow until it takes over the entire system in a relatively short time. As making a measurement with infinite precision is impossible (in a quantum universe, it is impossible by quantum uncertainty, in a classical universe, by the fact that you cannot fit the representation of the result inside the universe), simulating anything beyond a very short period of time is impossible, except in special well-behaved cases. Conscious beings is obviously not one of those special cases.
> And even if you could not predict with 100% accuracy, that is not to say that you are somehow choosing an alternate path, the end result is still determined by absolute physical laws.
It may be, but there is no way for this fact to affect anything in the universe.
> In that situation, the act of protecting individual freedom protects societal function more than the imprisonment of people who are perceived as potential threats
Only because people value individual freedom, which is a moral choice, which you say is evolved. Why did it evolve that way?
Anyway, what I've been trying to push you to answer here is this: If you do not believe in free will, what basis do you use to judge morals? So far, you mostly seem to say that morals are evolved to protect society, and that the good ones are those which make a society prosperous, and that individual happiness is only important in that a lack of it makes a society less prosperous.
But that's really dodging the hard questions, such as: If a change to society could make it more prosperous even though individual happiness decreases, should this change be implemented? Also, since evolution has no inherent value, why should an individual care about the evolved morals? And by what exact process do these morals evolve? Evolution requires birth, reproduction and death, generally. How do these processes work for moral systems?
>If a change to society could make it more prosperous even though individual happiness decreases, should this change be implemented?
There is no "should" about it. That's like asking "If a giraffe could grow a longer neck that enabled it to feed more easily, should it?" If social groups that develop this change are more successful, they will function better and outcompete groups that do not. We're talking over a very long term here though.
>Also, since evolution has no inherent value, why should an individual care about the evolved morals?
Because for most of us these behaviors are hard-wired genetically. Social communities whose members engage in behavior that strengthens the community are more likely to survive than communities whose members engage in detrimental behavior. Similarly, members of successful societies whose behavior conflicts with that society's "moral" standards are less likely to be able to function in that society, and are therefore less likely to propogate than members who do exhibit "moral" behavior.
>And by what exact process do these morals evolve? Evolution requires birth, reproduction and death, generally. How do these processes work for moral systems
It's all a matter of increased ability to survive. A group of organisms that behaves entirely selfishly, fighting amongst themselves, living solitarily, and so forth, are less likely to survive than a group of organisms that develops social skills, hunts as a group, protects each other, and so on. The group of organisms that exhibits social skills survives better and reproduces more. Eventually, after several generations, these social behaviors become instinctually hard-wired into the genes of the organisms in this community. The social behaviors that have led to increased survivability become known as "morals."
> Eventually, after several generations, these social behaviors become instinctually hard-wired into the genes of the organisms in this community.
You're speaking like a Lamarckian. If you want to make this claim, you have to explain the machanism that causes this to happen.
> We're talking over a very long term here though.
Indeed, we are talking longer terms than anything that remotely resembles what we think of as societies has existed, if you want to use the normal processes of evolution. Rapid evolution generally only happens under extreme circumstances, and normally the process is incredibly slow. Timescales of thousands of years is nothing compared to this. You will be very hard pressed to find an evolutionary biologist who would believe that anything but the most basic of morals could be based on genetic evolution. Morals in general are far more complex than can be accounted for by this theory of yours.
And you still did not explain why the moral principle of valuing individual happiness would evolve in the first place.
>You're speaking like a Lamarckian. If you want to make this claim, you have to explain the machanism that causes this to happen.
No, I never said anything about traits acquired during life being passed on genetically. I said that individuals who are more likely to exhibit social behavior are more likely to survive, more likely to produce offspring, and these offspring are more likely to exhibit that same social behavior for the same reason their parents were. I don't know what mechanism you want me to explain, this is the basics of natural selection here.
>You will be very hard pressed to find an evolutionary biologist who would believe that anything but the most basic of morals could be based on genetic evolution.
Isn't that what we're talking about? The basics of morals? I never said this development was unique to humans, I believe that these behaviors that are precursors to what we today consider to be morals began development millions of years ago with the first social groups of animals, and progressed from there.
>And you still did not explain why the moral principle of valuing individual happiness would evolve in the first place.
Complex animals by nature value their own personal happiness. This value is sometimes in conflict with value for the well being of the group. In modern society we attempt to strike a balance between these values. In western societies the majority has determined that personal freedom takes precedence over the well being of the group (to an extent. If murdering enhances your personal happiness, that behavior is still considered unacceptable.)
This discussion has deviated far from my original point. I'll try to steer it back towards it:
If you are asked to make a moral choice, basing it on your beliefs as presented in this thread, on what basis do you judge the options presented to you?
I judge based on what will give me the most pleasure in the long run. Sometimes that pleasure is derived from lack of guilt (for instance, I do not commit a crime, therefore I have no cause to feel remorse, therefore my pleasure is enhanced.)
Am I answering your question adequately? I can elaborate if you want me to.
What if I held hostage everyone dear to you, and gave you the choice between your life or theirs?
>>52
You looked up the wrong word. I'm interested in choice. Not free will.
maybe I should read the whole thread... and join in again ... eh
> I judge based on what will give me the most pleasure in the long run. Sometimes that pleasure is derived from lack of guilt (for instance, I do not commit a crime, therefore I have no cause to feel remorse, therefore my pleasure is enhanced.)
So your choices are then entirely selfish, and no external moral principles come into play except to the amount that you have been conditioned to feel bad about things?
Should you not then try to get rid of this conditioning against doing things which are immoral, in order to increase your happiness?
I do not feel bad soley because of conditioning, much of it is inherent. People who do not have the capacity for remorse are known as sociopaths.
And be honest with yourself, if you felt no remorse over anything, what's to stop you from doing something "immoral"? You might say "because it's wrong," but why is it wrong? "Because it hurts others," okay, but why do you care? "Because I wouldn't feel right doing it," would probably be your ultimate response. Therefore, guilt is the ultimate reason for not doing most things that we consider immoral. It just feels wrong.
Exactly. But if you believe morals are just arbitary inherited inhibitions, and you should only act in such a fashion that brings you the greatest happiness, does it not follow that you should try to rid yourself of the feelings of guilt and remorse, as they make you unhappy?
There's a psychological barrier to ridding yourself of those feelings of guilt and remorse though. Like I said, people who show no capacity for guilt or remorse are called sociopaths. You're born with sociopathic tendencies, you don't condition yourself to be that way.
>does it not follow that you should try to rid yourself of the feelings of guilt and remorse, as they make you unhappy?
For those of us who are not sociopaths, it is far easier to avoid feelings of guilt by conforming to our moral inhibitions, rather than undertake the incredibly difficult, perhaps even impossible task of reconditioning ourselves to no longer feel guilt.
Are you entirely sure that is the case? That seems a pretty frail reason to act morally, when the payoff for not doing so can be very large.
It seems like an entirely logical and rational explanation to me. What is this "large payoff" you get from not acting morally? You feel intensely guilty about it, and society punishes you for it. The personal gains would be almost exclusively material (due to the remorse involved,) and not very large at that.
I'm also curious, (if you've stated this already I must have missed it), but what is your belief regarding morals? And what does it have to do with free will?
> As much as I don't want to die, I'd want even less to be the reason for the death of my loved ones.
So whatever motivates you is not necessarily a pursuit of pleasure then.
If you die, there will be no further pleasure. If you don't die, there will be further pleasure. To maximize pleasure you shouldn't trade yourself for the others.
>So whatever motivates you is not necessarily a pursuit of pleasure then
Sure it is. The pleasure I get from knowing I saved the lives of my loved ones, however brief, would outweigh the grief/guilt I would feel the rest of my life if I had lived. Therefore pleasure is still maximized (a whole bunch really fast versus none for years to come)
This is starting to delve into the territory of altruism though (I believe there are no truly altruistic actions because every action is made with your own best interest in mind.)
Not from "not acting morally" - from ridding yourself of the urge to act morally. If you can act immorally without regret, your pleasure will surely increase quite a bit.
And my belief regarding morals is that they are inherently about choice, and without choice, there can be no logical justification for morals - you seem to agree on this, as you do not try to justify morals in any way, only explain them, but you do not entirely seem prepared to accept the consequences of this.
>If you can act immorally without regret
This is nearly impossible for psychologically normal people though. I consider it to be essentially a non-issue. Now if somehow you could then sure, you might be able to increase your pleasure, unless of course you end up being caught and punished by society. Even for people with no remorse, the law is still somewhat of a deterrant from immoral behavior.
> The pleasure I get from knowing I saved the lives of my loved ones, however brief, would outweigh the grief/guilt I would feel the rest of my life if I had lived.
Grief or guilt? That's not maximizing pleasure, dear friend. That's minimizing pain.
Also, believing that relief for your family compensates for the complete loss of any potential pleasure in the future is a bit dubious in my opinion. A single dose of heroin probably has a more profound effect, and you can take a whole lot of those in one lifetime...
You might find the topic of Pavlovian or operant conditioning to be of interest.
>That's not maximizing pleasure, dear friend. That's minimizing pain.
You're splitting hairs now. There is no 0 point on the scale, a place where pain stops and pleasure begins. It's either a shift towards the positive, or towards the negative. Minimizing pain is a shift towards the positive.
And besides that, we're not just talking about sensory pleasure here (like heroin) we're also talking about intrinsic pleasure from confidence, sense of self-worth, etc. If you were responsible for the death of all of your loved ones, those things would go down the tubes drastically for a long time to come, diminishing any potential pleasure you might experience in the future.
One more point to make, we're also talking about perceived benefit here. For instance, a person who commits suicide is obviously not maximizing their potential pleasure in life, but from their perspective they are taking the action that they perceive will have the greatest benefit to them.
You may be right that I am being pedantic. I can only go with what was written. Words have meaning, and pleasure isn't benefit.
Perceived benefit I might even agree with, although with some caveats. A lot of our behaviour is hardwired.
> This is nearly impossible for psychologically normal people though. I consider it to be essentially a non-issue.
But is this then the only reason you, personally, behave morally? Because you think it is too hard to overcome guilt, and you are afraid of punishment?
>>78
It was my original argument that most of our moral behavior is hardwired. But it's not hardwired in a way such that we perceive we're acting beyond our control, it's hardwired in such a way that when we act according to it, we feel as though we're acting in our own best interest.
>>79
I think that's the only reason anyone conforms to societal morals. Personal guilt, and fear of punishment. No guilt and no punishment means no incentive to behave in any particular way.
And it's not just too hard to overcome guilt, you (and I) would feel guilty for trying to overcome guilt, because you know what your intended outcome would be (to behave in a way that would normally make you feel guilty.) That in itself is a deterrant.
Even when you know intellectually that guilt is arbitary, and not everybody is bound by it?
Does this not mean your entire behavior is based on being weak of will?
What exactly do you mean by "arbitrary?" It's only as arbitrary as the rest of my emotions or biological desires.
That there is no higher reason or justification for it, as people generally like to believe.
I would say that there is no higher reason for it, but I still hesitate to call it arbitrary, because that seems to insinuate there is no logical justification for it either, which I believe there is (as explained in my whole natural selection thing before.)
I would not say that my behavior is based on being weak of will though. All my decisions (everyone's decisions in fact) are based on what they believe is in their best interest. I believe that there is no real benefit for me to lose the capacity for guilt, so I do not attempt to do so. Were I actually to lose the capacity for guilt, I might think otherwise, but currently my psychological state is such that I believe it is in my best interest to be capable of feeling guilt.
But natural selection works on averages and groups, not on individuals. There is no reason for an individual to give in to the blind pressures of evolution (if we for a moment accept that morals are evolved).
And if you can intellectualy conceive of a state that offers you greater happiness, but you do not attempt to reach it because of your inhibitions, how can you justify that behavior?
>There is no reason for an individual to give in to the blind pressures of evolution
If you act on a sexual urge, are you "giving in" to evolution? Sexual desire is an evolved trait, the same way that guilt and moral behavior are. You are afforded some degree of control over both of these, and neither are required for survival, but the need to act on these urges is hard wired into you.
>And if you can intellectualy conceive of a state that offers you greater happiness, but you do not attempt to reach it because of your inhibitions, how can you justify that behavior?
As I said before, I do not perceive that losing my capacity to feel guilt would offer me greater happiness. That is not to say that I know for certain it would not, but I do not perceive that it would, therefore I do not attempt to reach that state.
> If you act on a sexual urge, are you "giving in" to evolution?
Of course. But there's a positive payoff (well, generally speaking), so if you want to act to increase your happiness, there's nothing wrong in indulging. However, there's no benefit from guilt, and so it only makes sense to try and overcome it, if your only basis for acting in increasing happiness.
> As I said before, I do not perceive that losing my capacity to feel guilt would offer me greater happiness.
Losing a source of unhappiness would not increase your happiness?
>However, there's no benefit from guilt
Yes there is, the benefit from guilt is that it inhibits you from behaving in a way that is harmful to society. (Just as the benefit from sex is that you pass on your genes, both of these traits result in increased fitness.)
>Losing a source of unhappiness would not increase your happiness?
Guilt is only a source of unhappiness if I behave in a way that makes me feel guilty. It would a simple matter for me to lose that source of unhappiness by not behaving in ways that make me feel guilty. That's how most people deal with it.
> Yes there is, the benefit from guilt is that it inhibits you from behaving in a way that is harmful to society.
That is not a benefit for an intelligent individual. It is a benefit for society. It has no bearing on your actions as an indivdual, which is what I was asking about: How and why do you, personally, act?
> Guilt is only a source of unhappiness if I behave in a way that makes me feel guilty. It would a simple matter for me to lose that source of unhappiness by not behaving in ways that make me feel guilty.
And this restricts your options for acting in ways that may very well prevent you from increasing your happiness.
>That is not a benefit for an intelligent individual. It is a benefit for society.
Living in a society benefits an individual. That's how societies formed in the first place, organizations of individuals who work together survive better than individuals who live on their own. A benefit for society is therefore a benefit for the individuals who live in it.
>And this restricts your options for acting in ways that may very well prevent you from increasing your happiness.
I think your logic may be flawed here. If I behave in a way that makes me unhappy, your solution to increase my happiness is not to stop that behavior, but rather psychologically condition myself so that the behavior makes me happy instead. That would be like if you told me you broke your leg and it made you unhappy, so my solution was to tell you to just condition yourself to enjoy breaking your leg. After all, if you don't enjoy breaking your leg, you're just restricting yourself from increasing your happiness. Now I don't deny that it may be theoretically possible to condition yourself to enjoy breaking your leg, but I would argue that it would be unpleasant, nearly impossible, and bad for your physical well-being to boot.
Now you may argue that the only difference here is that immoral behavior is not physically bad for you. Well as long as you're living in a society with morals it is. If your society functions well, you benefit. If it does not function well (due to its members engaging in societally destructive behavior which we have termed "immoral" behavior,) then you do not benefit.
If you were to live outside of society, then (if not for guilt) you could engage in any "immoral" behavior you wish without any negative consequences to yourself. And in fact, people who live outside of society tend to go in this direction (pirates and such.) But this is only an increase to your overall happiness if you perceive the added benefit of being free in your actions to outweigh the benefit of living in a society. I personally believe I benefit more from living in a functional society (I can make use of doctors, grocery stores, police services, etc.) To me, those are worth more than the freedom to murder someone if I felt like it. Note we're still talking about a situation in which guilt has been abolished. As it stands, guilt is still a deterrant for me (and most people) to behave in that manner.
> Living in a society benefits an individual.
Only on average. Once again, I am not asking about averages, I am asking about your personal decisions. You cannot live your life making decisions based on averages over the whole population.
> I think your logic may be flawed here. If I behave in a way that makes me unhappy, your solution to increase my happiness is not to stop that behavior, but rather psychologically condition myself so that the behavior makes me happy instead.
No, my solution is to try to remove the already existing psychological conditioning that is making you feel unhappy without an actual, physical cause. "Behaving in this manner would be a detriment to society if everyone did it" is not something that causes you, personally, any disadvantage.
> That would be like if you told me you broke your leg and it made you unhappy, so my solution was to tell you to just condition yourself to enjoy breaking your leg.
No, the pain from breaking a leg serves an important purpose, notifiying you that something is indeed wrong. If you want to use that analogy, I am saying that if a bee stings you and causes pain, you should use whatever means you have to lessen that pain because it is not actually signalling any real danger to you, and is merely making you unhappy.
> If your society functions well, you benefit. If it does not function well (due to its members engaging in societally destructive behavior which we have termed "immoral" behavior,) then you do not benefit.
If only you, personally, misbehave, society will not suffer, at least not enough for it to have any measurable impact on you. For instance, if you scam some money out of the government, it's not like your personal tax burden is going to increase by the same amount. You claimed that you only act to increase your own happiness, but this cannot be true if you in fact also act to preserve society even when not doing so would not cause you any real disadvantage.
If you become a thief you lose your independence.
>the pain from breaking a leg serves an important purpose, notifiying you that something is indeed wrong.
The guilt from committing immoral actions also serves the purpose of notifying you that you are behaving in a manner that is "wrong" (or rather, contrary to your evolved nature.)
>You claimed that you only act to increase your own happiness, but this cannot be true if you in fact also act to preserve society even when not doing so would not cause you any real disadvantage.
You're reasoning as though I am intentionally causing myself to feel guilt after logically determining that my actions have been detrimental to society. That's not how it works, it's an instinctual response. Individuals who feel guilt about certain actions that are detrimental to communities are less likely to commit those actions, are then more likely to survive well in those communities, and therefore have greater fitness. We have evolved from those individuals, so those behaviors have become hardwired into us. When I feel guilt over doing something detrimental to society, it is because it is an instinctual response, just like a fear of predatory animals or a desire to engage in sexual activity. These are all behaviors that have evolved because they confer an advantage to those individuals who exhibit them.
> The guilt from committing immoral actions also serves the purpose of notifying you that you are behaving in a manner that is "wrong" (or rather, contrary to your evolved nature.)
That "evolution" happened under very, very different circumstances than those you actually live under. It's a toss-up whether or not they serve any useful purpose at this point. And either way, your intellect serves you much better in deciding which actions are beneficial than primitive instincts, I think you'll agree. There is still nothing inherently good about following your programming, and it definitely does not increase your happiness, which you said is how you judge actions.
> Individuals who feel guilt about certain actions...
You're still talking about people as generalizations. Once again, I did not ask about what people in general do, I asked about what you, personally do.
>You're still talking about people as generalizations. Once again, I did not ask about what people in general do, I asked about what you, personally do.
I believe I already answered that in >>90
>I personally believe I benefit more from living in a functional society (I can make use of doctors, grocery stores, police services, etc.) To me, those are worth more than the freedom to murder someone if I felt like it. Note we're still talking about a situation in which guilt has been abolished. As it stands, guilt is still a deterrant for me (and most people) to behave in that manner.
I do not believe I can remove my capacity for guilt any more than I can remove my capacity for fear or my capacity for sexual desire. Therefore, by behaving in a manner that avoids guilt, I am maximizing my pleasure to the best of my ability. Or a better way to phrase it would be to say I am behaving in a way that I perceive benefits me the most.
> I believe I already answered that in >>90
Sorry, I don't quite see it. Could you summarize? I'll summarize what I preceive to be your argument, and my problem with it:
I'd argue that your intellect is a far better guide than your insticts, but you seem to defer to instincts and entirely dismiss even attempting to override them by the use of intellect. I can't really say this way of living your life appeals to me.
> I do not believe I can remove my capacity for guilt any more than I can remove my capacity for fear or my capacity for sexual desire.
Many, many people have done either of those. So once again, it seems to me that you are living your life based on the assumption that you are too weak of will to do anything better for yourself.
So...
Who's that who says "who's that" when I say "who's that?"
Your summarization sounds pretty accurate.
>I'd argue that your intellect is a far better guide than your insticts
In the case of morals, why? Please explain.
>Many, many people have done either of those.
Sure you can overcome a porn addiction, or overcome a fear of spiders, but to fear nothing? To sexually desire nothing? I seriously doubt there are people who have willed themselves to be in that state. If you can name some examples and cite sources, I'd be interested to look at them.
>> I'd argue that your intellect is a far better guide than your insticts
> In the case of morals, why? Please explain.
I can't think of any situation where insticts are a better guide than intellect in the first place, so I don't even know where to start explaining that.
Well, maybe one exception would be when you are in a state of abject terror. That's the only one I can think of. As you seldom make moral decisions in a state of abject terror, intellect still wins out.
> Sure you can overcome a porn addiction, or overcome a fear of spiders, but to fear nothing? To sexually desire nothing? I seriously doubt there are people who have willed themselves to be in that state. If you can name some examples and cite sources, I'd be interested to look at them.
Why do you assume you would have to overcome everything before it counts?
>I can't think of any situation where insticts are a better guide than intellect in the first place, so I don't even know where to start explaining that.
Well give me an example of an intellectual rationalization for certain moral behaviors.
>Why do you assume you would have to overcome everything before it counts?
Because that's what we're talking about here. Sure you can overcome feeling guilty about some things that it's irrational to get upset over (for example, guilt over skipping a class, or calling in sick to work,) but to overcome feeling guilt about everything (or at least the "big" things) is what we've been talking about.
> Well give me an example of an intellectual rationalization for certain moral behaviors.
You've opened a book on the philosophy of morals, have you not?
> Because that's what we're talking about here. Sure you can overcome feeling guilty about some things that it's irrational to get upset over (for example, guilt over skipping a class, or calling in sick to work,) but to overcome feeling guilt about everything (or at least the "big" things) is what we've been talking about.
No, we are not. That would be silly. Whereever did you get that idea? And how do you differentiate a "big" thing from a non-"big" thing?
>You've opened a book on the philosophy of morals, have you not?
If I have, I am unaware of it. A brief search reveals an essay by Immanuel Kant in which he states "Instruction in the laws of morality is not drawn from observation of oneself or of our animal nature, nor from perception of the course of the world in regard to what happens, or how men act."
In this regard, I disagree, the laws of morality are wholly derived from our animal nature.
I still invite you to give me an intellectual rationalization for certain moral behaviors. I belive that any such rationalization will ultimately boil down to instinctual behavior as a product of evolution.
>No, we are not. That would be silly. Whereever did you get that idea? And how do you differentiate a "big" thing from a non-"big" thing?
All along you have been telling me that if I act purely to increase my happiness, that by abolishing my capacity for guilt, I can be even happier, and that since I claim to act intellectually, it would be illogical for me to not do so. This seems to me to encompass guilt over all things (especially since you did not specify which things it is okay to feel guilty about, and which things it is not.)
As for what a "big" thing is, that would be anything that is considered to be absolutely immoral by society as a whole (rape, murder, that sort of thing) as opposed to things that are opposed by a few or a minority, or opposed only some of the time (such as lying, shirking ones' professional duties, etc.)
In Free Willy the killer whale was actually kept in captivity so long during filming that they needed to keep it on antidepressants.
>>103 don't fuck up the discussion of the other 2 posters here.
Other people are welcome to chime in, as long as it's relevant.
The very question of free will inherently implies dualism. By rejecting religion, the soul and other spiritual nonsense, the question simply goes away.
Or to phrase this in the form of a question...what can the will be free from?
All freedom can be defined in two ways, as a freedom to or a freedom from. The idea of free will concerns itself with the freedom to choose. This sounds interesting at first, but when turned around it becomes freedom from the flesh. This shows the question fully dependent upon us accepting that our minds can exist independent of the rest of us.
What I claim is that there can be no freedom from the body, the brain or our many nerve endings, nor does there have to be, because it's the only entity. When the entity making the choices is the same thing as the one constraining the choices, the will goes unchained.
Since no one answered when I posted it before, I'll try again.
Who's that who says "who's that" when I say "who's that?"
Heh, "the will goes unchained" is just a phrase I took from a series of old text files from the early 90s. It doesn't mean much, it was just used all the time, even when it had no apparent relation to the rest of the text.
A failed attempt at humour through obscurity, I suppose.
Is it bad?
Let's say you play a video game - why do you play it?
The game follows a predetermined route, you are constrained by its rules, your "will" is subject to the programmer's will, you have limited choices... Shouldn't you refuse to play any and all games because your "free will" is restricted in those?
Ha, I see someone posted the same logic as mine in the second post of the original thread at http://4-ch.net/general/kareha.pl/1171775011/
Then I don't get this thread. What's the question?